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MEASURE FOR MEASURE: COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Irma S. Russell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars as well as engineers say "[y]ou [m]anage [w]hat [y]ou [m]easure."1
This statement suggests that effective measurement is essential to influencing
outcomes-whether those outcomes relate to physical phenomena, policy goals, or legal
interests. While the statement may be more accurate in its negative form (i.e., you do not
manage what you do not measure), measurement is clearly essential to decision-making
today. Without effective measurement, legal systems or policies produce little more than
rhetoric and symbolism.2 Recognition of this point is not new. In his timeless problem
plays, Measure for Measure and The Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare dramatized the
competing values of freedom, economic enterprise, and human life. 3 The contemporary
version of the debate regarding enterprise and human safety is nowhere more intense
* Dean, University of Montana School of Law. The author expresses appreciation for the comments of
friends and colleagues on earlier versions of this article, including Michael Gerrard, Tracy Hester, and Sidney
A. Shapiro. She thanks Houston T. Musick, Jared Nelson, Michael Matison, and Archibald Miller for their
helpful research assistance.
1. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You
Measure, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1335, 1335 (1996); see also Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in
Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 633 (1994).
2. While symbolic action has a place in the ordering of nations and individuals, it is insufficient protection
for important interests such as those represented by legislation for public safety.
3. The central plot line of Measure for Measure involves laws against licentious behavior. Another
famous Shakespearian problem play is The Merchant of Venice, which also explores the balancing of interests.
It presents a contract with a repayment date and an agreed remedy for breach of the obligation: a pound of flesh
of the payor, taken from any part of his body at the option of the payee. This remedy includes the certain result
of death for the breaching party if the plaintiff chooses the pound of flesh of the debtor's heart. In Measure for
Measure, the Duke leaves Lord Angelo in charge of the city, but, rather than leaving town, the Duke takes on a
disguise as a friar and observes the actions of Lord Angelo as he serves as the substitute authority. Angelo
creates a moralistic regime, seeking to rid the city of brothels and unlawful sexual activity by strictly enforcing
long-established laws. He arrests and sentences Claudio to death on the ground that he has impregnated his
lover outside of marriage. When Isabelle, Claudio's chaste sister, pleads with Angelo to spare her brother,
Angelo agrees to release Claudio if Isabelle will have sexual intercourse with him. Angelo refuses to pardon
Claudio, and the Duke returns and reveals his identity. Angelo confesses to his misdeeds, and Claudio is
pardoned. Amy Ross, Vienna Then and Now: The Impact of Shakespeare's Measure for Measure on the
Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 46 S.D. L. Rev. 781, 782, 786-800 (2001).
Critics, for lack of a better way to describe the play, have referred to Measure as a "problem play,"
defined as:
A play in which we find a concern with a moral problem which is central to it, presented in
such a manner that we are unsure of our moral bearings, so that uncertain and divided
responses to it in the minds of the audience are possible and even probable.
Overall, Measure presents readers with no absolutes. The play is comprised of a "desperate, and
surely deliberate, confusion of values."
Id. at 784 (footnotes omitted).
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than in the area of cost-benefit analysis and environmental policy. The central premise
of this Article is that because effective decision-making is not possible without accurate
measurements and comparisons of interests, judges, and policy makers must incorporate
explicit measurements and comparisons of legal interests.
The occasion of these reflections is the celebration of Professor Cass Sunstein's
work. Although numbers alone cannot give the full measure of Professor Sunstein's
contribution to legal thought, the numbers are impressive and revealing. In more than 30
books and over 220 articles, essays, and reviews, Professor Sunstein covers topics as
diverse as behavioral economics and worst-case scenarios, judicial decision making, and
the cost-benefit state. 4 His writing on environmental policy registers over 150 articles
and numerous books, 5 including nearly 100 articles on the topic of global climate
change, arguably "the greatest environmental challenge facing the world today." 6 That
Professor Sunstein's contribution is immeasurable is clear from its influence on public
opinion as well as academics. 7 Study of his vision of choice architecture has broad
applicability, including the power to nudge consumers toward healthy and "green"
choices. 8 He has explained in memorable ways the fact that, in reality, human
interactions do not function in the ways attributed to the economic rational actor in
economic theory, a point with clear implications for environmental policy.9 Taking
seriously Professor Sunstein's suggestions on the use of disclosure requirements would
produce environmentally positive impacts for industry and consumer choices.10
4. Harv. L. Sch., Cass R. Sunstein, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=552
(accessed Nov. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Sunstein]; U. Chi. L. Sch., Publications, Presentations, and Works in
Progress, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/sunstein/ppw.html (accessed Nov. 22, 2008) [hereinafter
Publications].
5. Sunstein, supra n. 4; Publications, supra n. 4.
6. Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1605, 1605
(2007); Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter, and Asia Matters Most of All, 15
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 113, 113 (2007) ("Energy is the single most important problem facing humanity today.")
(quoting Nobel Laureate, Richard Smalley).
7. For example, his latest book, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, which
he co-authored with Richard Thaler, is as entertaining as it is informative. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale U. Press 2008). The
authors recommend "environmental nudges, helping to reduce air pollution (and the emission of greenhouse
gases)." Id. at 6.
8. For a discussion on how consumer decision-making is influenced by a "nudge," see id. at 1-4.
9. In reconfiguring the inquiry on human action, Professor Sunstein compares "Humans and Econs":
Those who reject paternalism often claim that human beings do a terrific job of making choices, and
if not terrific, certainly better than anyone else would do (especially if that someone else works for
the government). Whether or not they have ever studied economics, many people seem at least
implicitly committed to the idea of homo economicus, or economic man-the notion that each of us
thinks and chooses unfailingly well, and thus fits within the textbook picture of human beings
offered by economists.
If you look at economics textbooks, you will learn that homo economicus can think like Albert
Einstein, store as much memory as IBM's Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of Mahatma
Gandhi. Really. But the folks that we know are not like that. Real people have trouble with long
division if they don't have a calculator, sometimes forget their spouse's birthday, and have a
hangover on New Year's Day. They are not homo economicus; they are homo sapiens. To keep
our Latin usage to a minimum we will hereafter refer to these imaginary and real species as Econs
and Humans.
Id. at 6-7.
10. Professor Sunstein and other scholars have been focusing on disclosure regarding environmental issues,
[Vol. 43:891
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Moreover, his insights into the importance of framing policy issues have profound
implications for government policy, particularly in the areas of environment and
energy.'' Professor Sunstein's writing provides insights into both the utility and the
limits of cost-benefit analysis and reveals the uncertainties and indeterminacies in the
cost-benefit analysis process. Moreover, Professor Sunstein's continuing focus on cost-
benefit analysis makes his work a template for understanding and evaluating the place of
cost-benefit analysis in the law.
Part II of this Article explores foundational principles of effective measurement
and comparison, both from a general perspective and from the specific perspective of
legal interests, suggesting that consistency is an irreducible minimum of cost-benefit
analysis as well as other types of legal analysis. Part III considers cost-benefit analysis
in regulatory and judicial decision-making and sets forth some of the scholarly critiques
of the cost-benefit analysis process. Part IV focuses on lessons Professor Sunstein
identifies regarding the use of the cost-benefit process in his article Cost-Benefit Analysis
without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and
Stigmatic Harms.12 In this article, Professor Sunstein celebrates Judge Richard Posner's
contributions to the law 13 and critiques Posner's application of cost-benefit analysis in
the influential opinion Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration.14 In
the course of his critique, Professor Sunstein discusses the proper focus and framing of
cost-benefit analysis under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") test for
reasonable accommodation providing lessons of general applicability of cost-benefit
analysis and emphasizing the importance of identifying the "real questions" 15 attending
any legal inquiry. Part V draws on Professor Sunstein's lessons, focusing on application
of cost-benefit analysis to the most significant environmental issue of our time, global
climate change, and treatment of this issue by Professors Sunstein and Posner in their
article Climate Change Justice.16  Part VI concludes with some questions and
observations about the utility and limitations on the use of cost-benefit analysis,
particularly in the environmental area.
II. INCOMMENSURATE INTERESTS: OF APPLES AND SKYSCRAPERS
Recognition of the principle of consistent measurement appears in the common
caution against comparing apples and oranges. When we assert that someone (generally
an opponent) is comparing apples and oranges, we mean that the items being compared
are incomparable. What do we mean by this well-known and often repeated exhortation
against apples and oranges? It seems to say that useful comparisons are not possible
without measurement. Likewise, comparison lacks validity absent a consistent yardstick.
including global climate change. E.g. Jeffrey A. Smith, Matthew Morreale & Michael E. Mariani, Climate
Change Disclosure: Moving towards a Brave New World, 3 Cap. Mkts. L.J. 469, 471(2008) (noting that
climate change disclosure fails to provide a basis for comparison of action since no universal standard for
disclosure exists).
11. Thaler & Sunstein, supra n. 7, at 36-37.
12. 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1895 (2007).
13. Id.
14. 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
15. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1906.
16. 96 Geo. L.J. 1565 (2008).
2008]
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The need for consistent measurement applies regardless of the character of the units of
measurement and regardless of the nature of the attributes compared, so long as each is
susceptible to a single measurement.
Nevertheless, a comparison of different things-such as apples and oranges-can
be valid. Indeed, comparisons of different things such as apples and oranges can be
fruitful as long as a consistent measurement can be found for making the comparison. 17
Professor Sunstein's focus on the importance of framing issues, as well as common
sense, elucidates the rule against comparing apples and oranges. The rule necessarily
addresses the yardstick employed rather than the subject of the measurement.
Measurements lack validity when the methods of comparison are incommensurate. But
comparisons have validity when a common measure is possible. Thus, the scientist can
validly compare apples and oranges-or apples and icebergs, apples and racecars,
oranges and skyscrapers-by use of a consistent measuring device applied consistently
to each item. Pounds or calories, inches or mass, moisture-content, color, sugar,
radioactivity, and light absorption are all legitimate measures and provide the basis for
valid comparisons when consistently applied. Science and law can compare any attribute
so long as they can measure by a common yardstick.
The basic principles provide a starting place for measuring interests, as well as
physical phenomena. The strength of the principle of consistent measurement, as applied
to legal interests, is its obviousness: a level field, one yardstick, no thumbs on the scale.
An inevitable principle of measuring legal interests is that a common method of
measure must apply to the interests in competition, absent a doctrine that prefers one
party over the other. If one party's interests are measured by a subjective reckoning of
his interest, then the yardstick of subjective measurement should also apply to a party
injured by the exercise of his subjective interests. Professors Cooter and Ulen make this
point in explaining Pareto efficiency by measuring the interests of parties by the same
standard: "A particular situation is said to be Pareto efficient if it is impossible to change
it so as to make at least one person better off (in his own estimation) without making
another person worse off (again, in his own estimation)." 18 It would be obviously unfair
to elevate the values or preferences of one party over the other. Thus, a theory that
adopts a subjective measure should apply a like-kind measure to all interests considered
as part of its rationale, absent a valid reason for varying the measurement of the interests.
Likewise, when one interest is measured by an objective standard, that same objective
standard should apply to all competing interests absent a valid reason for differentiation.
The search for consistent measures must consider "collectives of people,"
including nations, as well as individuals, including consumers and corporate actors. 19
17. Yes, the comparison can be fruitful.
18. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 12 (Andrea Shaw et al. eds., 3d ed., Addison
Wesley Longman, Inc. 2000).
19. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1571. In Climate Change Justice, Professors Sunstein and Posner
identify interests of nations, treating nations as individual actors for purposes such as economic interests in
GNP, while rejecting the individual focus on a nation when considering issues of responsibility. Id. at 1568-
74, 1583-86. This alternating focus presents a shift in measurement and treatment, considering unified benefits
and costs for some purposes but emphasizing the collection of individuals within the nation for purposes of
responsibility. Id. By contrast, environmental law incorporates a responsibility ethic for governmental entities,
including the federal government. Id.
[Vol. 43:891
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Analysis and treatment of people, in collectives or as individual actors, have particular
significance in measuring interests and utility. A measure of collective interests for
purposes of measuring benefits should also apply a measure of collective interests for
purposes of costs. As Professor Sunstein emphasized in his essay on Judge Posner's
ADA analysis, 2 1 the frame of a comparison is often determinative. Deciding which
interests should be compared and finding the "real questions" to frame the comparison
are essential to the outcome of any analysis.
Accuracy in measuring, whether by weight in a sale of goods or by metes and
bounds in a sale of real estate, is essential, as with measuring devices and techniques in
the law. Judicial opinions are filled with references to fair balances, weighing and
balancing interests, equilibrium, and other metaphors for consistent measurement and
consistent comparison.2 2 Such judicial metaphors can be problematic, however. Justice
Scalia addressed the difficulty of measuring and balancing competing interests in Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.2 3 He pointed out the futility of trying to
balance incommensurate interests, using the mixed measures of length and weight:
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the Court then proceeds to
judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called "balancing,"... but the
scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy.
2 4
Likewise, Professor Sunstein pointed to the problem of incommensurate interests
in Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits, noting that a "standard
difficulty" of cost-benefit analysis is in neglecting to consider "costs and benefits that are
not easily measured," such as costs that are "difficult to turn into monetary
equivalents. '"25 Justice Scalia's point brings home the fact that consistent measurement
does not mean that all interests are of equal importance. Considerations of
proportionality and the gravity of the interests at stake lead to a hierarchy of interests
recognized by laws. 26  This is surely part of Shakespeare's point in constructing a
contract that is nothing short of ghoulish.2 7 Statutes often adjust the balance of interests.
Taking such adjustments into consideration is a necessary step in interpreting a statute
20. Perhaps the most memorable exploration of rational action from the perspective of the collective versus
individual action is found in Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
21. Sunstein, supra n. 12.
22. See e.g. Nall. Treas. Employees Union v. Chertoff, 385 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2005) (calling new
standards for collective bargaining "new metes and bounds for collective bargaining").
23. 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. (citation omitted)
25. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1903.
26. The strength of the social norm for protecting safety and physical integrity of members of society
individually, as well as collectively, informs both common law and statutory law standards. Similarly,
society's choice of punishment for the breach of criminal laws reflects the importance of the norm violated.
Tort law and contract law present different damage formulas based on differing norms of protection and
differing views of the culpability of the conduct sanctioned. Ordinarily the law will not provide punitive
damages to punish a breach of contract. Punishment is available when a party commits a tort that the law
regards as outrageous. The legal categories of criminal law, tort law, and contract law present a complex
matrix of judgments regarding the strength of the interests at stake and the strength of social opprobrium for the
breach of norms.
27. For a discussion of Shakespeare as it relates to cost-benefit analysis, see supra, n. 3.
20081
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and determining what role, if any, cost-benefit analysis should play in the application of
the statute. For example, Professor Sunstein makes the point that the ADA requires a
subjective standard on the issue of emotional harm and stigma.28 He argues that the
purposes and intent of the ADA justifies a subjective measure for the disabled. 29 This
judgment results from assessing congressional intent in the ADA.30
Economic and property interests ordinarily are not given the same weight as the
interests in physical integrity, life, and liberty.3 1  Just as Shakespeare does in The
Merchant of Venice, tort law accords greater weight to physical safety and bodily
integrity than to economic rights. Tort law creates a system of incentives that
encourages safe, rather than negligent practices, even though the negligent practices
might be profitable to the actor absent the legal incentives at issue. Thus, the principle of
consistent measurement is cabined within comparisons of competing interests.
Traditionally, the law requires equal assessment and measurement of competing interests
within a category, such as economic or financial interests, 32 and mandates a conscious
ranking of the strength of the interests at issue. Identifying an appropriate measure for a
particular loss also involves judgments about the grievousness of the loss and the ex ante
value of the thing lost.
Getting the analysis right is no easy task under any system. Success in analysis
necessarily involves a judgment of what interests are accorded greater weight. As
Justice Scalia points out, courts judge "which [interest] is more important." 33 As the
regulatory state has evolved, courts defer to agencies, and regulators rely on cost-benefit
analysis. Nevertheless, cost-benefit analysis is not universally embraced as the
methodology to answer (or ask) the right questions. Legislation sometimes requires its
use and sometimes bars or restricts its use, and scholars call for further scrutiny of the
process.
III. MEASURING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Although questions about measuring and ranking interests predate Shakespeare,
the debate is by no means settled. Increased risks to human life and public health in
today's world have heightened concerns about systems ranking risks. Cost-benefit
analysis has arisen as a way for judges and agencies to attempt to measure legal interests
and assess regulatory strategies. Cost-benefit analysis holds appeal as a way of making
informed and reasonable decisions. Any method that disciplines intuitions and
28. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1902 (commenting that "Judge Posner was willing to 'assume without having
to decide' that emotional barriers to full integration into the workplace 'are relevant.' (If we are engaged in
cost-benefit analysis, why assume without deciding? It seems clear that emotional barriers are real costs, and
potentially high ones.) But here, he concluded that separate but equal was unobjectionable-even if it was not
quite equal.") (footnote omitted).
29. Id.
30. The Act does not include a measure of emotional issues for the employer. Considerations of emotional
harm and stigma of the employer are not within the purposes of the ADA.
31. See generally Irma S. Russell, The Logic of Legal Remedies and the Relative Weight of Norms:
Assessing the Public Interest in the Tort Reform Debate, 39 Akron L. Rev. 1053 (2006).
32. See United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1996).
33. Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 Sup. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
[Vol. 43:891
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prejudices through a rigorous system of comparison of interests has strong appeal. Such
a system seems to offer profound advantages over conclusory judgments or simple
syllogistic reasoning. Whether the use of cost-benefit analysis lessens undesirable
indeterminacy in decision-making or achieves greater clarity in policy and judicial
decisions remains unclear, however.
The growing reliance on cost-benefit analysis in judicial decision-making, agency
regulations, and scholarly analysis enhances the impact of cost-benefit analysis, resulting
in heightened competition in the calculus of economics versus lives in ways Shakespeare
could not have imagined. 34 The use of cost-benefit analysis in the law is the topic of
Judge Posner's recently published book How Judges Think.35 In this work, Judge Posner
points to the use of economics (including cost-benefit analysis) for improved judicial
decision making. "The most important theory that is not limited to constitutional law,
though it embraces it, is economics." 36  Judge Posner reviews theories of judicial
decision making. Judge Posner's approach rests in large part on a belief that the
indeterminacy of the current method of reaching decisions leaves judges free to apply
their own personal value systems in ways that are not beneficial to the legal system or to
the litigants whose disputes are subject to judicial resolution.3 7  Asserting that
sociological, economic, organizational, pragmatic, legalistic, and policy choice
approaches 38 fail to explain judicial behavior, Judge Posner asserts that unconscious
preconceptions and intuitions play a significant role in judicial decisions. Rejecting
other theories of judging, Judge Posner asserts that legal issues "can be answered with a
fair degree of objectivity by judges armed with basic economic skills and insights," 39
Judge Posner recommends an approach based on pragmatic adjudication. 40 He asserts
that "economic analysis has helped move judges from reliance on instinct and semantics
to something closer to cost-benefit analysis." 4 1 Recognition of problems in measuring
and comparing incommensurate interests, limitations on the utility of cost-benefit
analysis, and the necessarily provisional nature of policy analysis have great significance
in environmental policy. The claim is that cost-benefit analysis results in better
decisions in the sense that the decisions are less susceptible to personal values of the
judge or other decision maker.
In difficult cases, which are so mainly because they are cases in which the
orthodox materials of legal decision-making cannot produce a satisfactory decision
(sometimes cannot produce a decision, period), judges are perforce reliant on other
34. See Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, 158 N.Y. Times IA (Oct. 29,
2008) (reporting that President Bush's appointment of younger conservative judges transformed federal appeals
courts and including rhetoric conservative judges provided "neutral application of the law").
35. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Harv. U. Press 2008).
36. Id. at 237.
37. Id. at 107.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Id. at 77.
40. Posner, supra n. 35, at 238 (asserting that "[t]he "significance of economics for the study of judicial
behavior lies mainly in the consilience of economics with pragmatism," and that "[t]he economist, like the
pragmatist, is interested in ferreting out practical consequences rather than engaging in a logical or semantic
analysis of legal doctrines." (footnote omitted)).
41. Id. at 212.
2008]
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sources for their decision. They must find something to move them off dead center, and
the modem law professor can help them in their quest. In a number of areas of law,
economic analysis has helped move judges from reliance on instinct and semantics to
something closer to cost-benefit analysis. This has produced a gain in precision and
concreteness that should actually warm a legalist's heart because it reduces the area in
which judges make decisions in a fog of emotion and undisciplined intuition.42
A review of the scholarship of the area reveals diversity regarding the scope and
framework of cost-benefit analysis, raising questions about whether indeterminacy is
decreased by the use of this analytical frame. Cost-benefit analysis has received growing
critical attention in recent years. Critics charge inaccuracy and bias, 43 lack of
transparency, lack of reliability,4 4 and inadequate monetizing of benefits, meaning that
fairly complete cost estimates are often balanced against inadequate estimates of
benefits. 45  As we will see from Professor Sunstein's evaluation of Judge Posner's
application of cost-benefit analysis, however, cost-benefit analysis can be as susceptible
to furthering prejudices as it is to disciplining them. He notes that, "as practiced within
the judiciary, cost-benefit analysis ... can operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions
rather than a way of disciplining them .... ,46 This point suggests a need for better
understanding of cost-benefit analysis.
It should also be noted that the process of cost-benefit analysis itself is not costless.
One way to justify the system of analysis would be to require that the cost-benefit
analysis process itself pass a stringent cost-benefit analysis before it is applied in a given
area. Do the benefits of using the system outweigh its costs? As with many issues in the
law, the contest between two approaches has a burden of proof aspect. Is the utility of
cost-benefit analysis sufficiently justified under its own rubric in the case at hand? The
tendency of this method is delay and paralysis, and the possible result is that legislative
mandate is reduced to symbolism rather than effective regulation.
Skeptics point out.., that regulated companies are generally better organized and can
devote more resources to preparing and critiquing cost-benefit analyses than public interest
groups arguing in favor of greater governmental protections. They maintain that the very
process of preparing the analyses acts as a drag on the implementation of protective
42. Id. at 211-12.
43. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 433, 457-58 (2008) (asserting that cost-benefit analysis results "are
often biased by the analyst's policy preferences or the value judgments that are implicit in rational choice
methodologies" with opponents to regulations presenting "benefit estimates that are far lower than the agency's
estimates or those of pro-regulatory sources." (footnote omitted)).
44. Thomas McGarity states:
The cost estimates have in the past proven notoriously unreliable, because they have often relied
heavily upon information provided by regulated entities that have an obvious stake in the outcome
of the proceedings. Even cost assessments from unbiased sources are rarely accurate to within one
or two orders of magnitude. The risk estimates that underlie these calculations can vary over five to
ten orders of magnitude, depending upon the models selected and the exposure assumptions that are
plugged into those models.
Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 7, 52-53 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
45. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra n. 43, at 454 (noting "that estimates often end up monetizing only some
benefits of a health or environmental regulation because of the inability to monetize all of the risks it reduces").
46. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1896.
[Vol. 43:891
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Significant criticism has been leveled against cost-benefit analysis on numerous
grounds, including assertions that it "smuggles" in considerations of efficiency despite a
statute's rejection of efficiency in a particular context, 48 and it fails to consider non-
economic values sufficiently.4 9  In Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, Professors Sidney A. Shapiro and Christopher H. Schroeder review some
of the problems associated with cost-benefit analysis.
As a means to improve agency transparency and accountability, CBA has serious flaws.
Most of the elements of CBA-the cost data that goes into the analysis, the conclusions
that are extracted from risk information through the "weight of the evidence" approach that
agencies follow, the selection of models required at various stages of the quantitative risk
assessment process, the assumptions necessary to build the inferential bridges that must be
crossed when there are gaps in the data--are all subject to manipulation, whether by
interested parties with sufficient resources to do so or by agencies pursuing their own
agendas.
50
Some scholars see cost-benefit analysis as a means of devaluing health and
environmental protections passed by Congress, allowing regulators to muffle or trump
the law through regulation.
Congress enacted most health and environmental laws to protect some members of the
public from the harmful aspects of conduct engaged in by other members of the public.
Many beneficiaries of these laws believe that cost-benefit proponents are biased against the
protective approaches that Congress adopted in existing protective legislation. Given the
difficulty in quantifying benefits, they challenge the presumption that nothing should be
done to protect the health and the environment until the government can meet the
affirmative burden of demonstrating that the benefits of a particular initiative will outweigh
the costs. 
5 1
Others charge that the use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory realm minimizes
public influence.
Cost-benefit analysis is a complex, resource-intensive, and expert-driven process. It
requires a great deal of time and effort to attempt to unpack even the simplest cost-benefit
analysis. Few community groups, for example, have access to the kind of scientific and
technical expertise that would allow them to evaluate whether, intentionally or
unintentionally, the authors of a cost-benefit analysis have unfairly slighted the interests of
47. McGarity, supra n. 44, at 57 (footnote omitted).
48. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra n. 43, at 461 (noting that in some cases "[t]he White House may insist that
agencies adjust their regulatory policies based on the results of an RIA, and if this occurs, the value of
'efficiency' is smuggled into decisionmaking even if a statute rejects economic efficiency as a value that
should determine the level of regulation." (footnote omitted)).
49. See e.g. Lead Indus. Assn., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150-53 (D.C . Cir. 1980) (holding that the
EPA was not authorized to consider economic or technological feasibility in setting air quality standards); see
also Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 Geo. L.J. 2341, 2343 (2002) (citing cost-
benefit analysis as the reason the EPA has not limited exposure to toxic chemicals under TSCA and noting the
huge uncertainties that accompany attempts to quantify and compare costs and benefits of health, safety, and
environmental regulation); see generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and
Regulatory Metrics, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1741 (2008).
50. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra n. 43, at 495.
51. McGarity, supra n. 44, at 56 (footnotes omitted).
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the community or some of its members. Few members of the public can participate
meaningfully in the debates about the use of articular regression analyses or discount rates
which are central to the cost-benefit method.
The issue of measurement is of great significance in this debate. Both cost and risk
assessments "rely heavily on mathematical models of reality," with the result that
"assumptions and inferences that fill the factual gaps depend as much on policy as upon
economic judgment. The end result is that cost assessments are also highly uncertain and
policy-dependent." 53  Professor Thomas 0. McGarity examined the problem of
incommensurate measures in A Cost-Benefit State:
[Q]uantitative cost-benefit analysis requires the analyst to reduce costs and benefits to a
common metric to facilitate comparisons. Since costs are usually expressed in dollars,
analysts typically attempt to translate risk assessments into benefits assessments by
assigning dollar values to reduced risks to health and the environment. .... [A]ssigning
dollar values to human health and important environmental entities is quite controversial,
and there is little agreement among educated observers as to how, or even whether, it
should be undertaken.
54
As Professor McGarity argues, strong reasons exist for opposing prospective
valuing of life.
Some especially ambitious advocates of risk-based priority setting would combine
quantitative risk assessment and cost analyses to arrive at a numerical cost-per-life-saved
for potential rulemaking initiatives.
The cost estimates have in the past proven notoriously unreliable, because they have often
relied heavily upon information provided by regulated entities that have an obvious stake
in the outcome of the proceedings. Even cost assessments from unbiased sources are rarely
accurate to within one or two orders of magnitude.
55
In Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, Frank
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling point to fundamental flaws in such costing out of lives,
by stating that "cost-benefit analysis involves the creation of artificial markets for
things-like good health, long life, and clean air-that are not bought and sold. It also
involves the devaluation of future events through discounting." 56  The question of
valuing life comes into play both as a stand-alone issue and as a criticism of the use of
cost-benefit analysis. Some statements of the issues are reminiscent of Shakespeare's
articulation in The Merchant of Venice. 57
Human life is the ultimate example of a value that is not a commodity and does not
have a price. You cannot buy the right to kill someone for $6.3 million, nor for any other
price. Most systems of ethical and religious belief maintain that every life is sacred. If
52. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1577-78 (2002).
53. McGarity, supra n. 44, at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 50, 52-53 (footnote omitted).
56. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra n. 52, at 1562.
57. See supra n. 3, for a discussion of The Merchant of Venice.
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analysts calculated the value of life itself by asking people what it is worth to them (the
most common method of valuation of other environmental benefits), the answer would
be infinite, as "'no finite amount of money could compensate a person for the loss of his
life, simply because money is no good to him when he is dead.",58
The question of valuing life provides a dramatic example of mixed measures.
Such actions involve measuring the economic value of the lives of particular people.
Just as jurors set a price on a life in a wrongful death action as an economic matter,
Hobbes argued for an external and objective price for valuing a particular person's life.
The defendant who has caused this loss of life through negligence or wrongdoing
receives the benefit of an objective standard of valuing. The valuing in the tort context is
necessary because the life is already lost. The problem in the regulatory sphere is that
valuing hypothetical lives creates the artificial market that Professors Ackerman and
Heinzerling criticize in Pricing the Priceless. Moreover, the incentives of the law do not
end at this point. Punitive damages insert intentional uncertainty into the formula with
the result that the price set does not create a market value to measure lives prospectively.
As a practical matter, the uncertainty of punitive damages serves as a hedge against gross
negligence or intentional actions that would result in future deaths. 59 The cost-benefit
analysis approach of regulatory policy, on the other hand, values lives of hypothetical
victims, using a standardized measure of the value of these lives. Even setting aside
moral aspects of the question of valuing life fails to yield an easy analysis. 6 0 The
incommensurate monetizing of lives prospectively is the center of the dispute.6 1 While
the proponents of cost-benefit analysis believe that it is the only rational system of
weighing the pros and cons of policy proposals, other scholars disagree.
6 2
The place to begin a consideration of cost-benefit analysis in any given question is
the particular law or legal doctrine at issue. While some laws explicitly require cost-
benefit analysis, 63 others prohibit its use.64 A wide area of discretionary judgment on
58. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra n. 52, at 1564 (footnote omitted).
59. See Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59
Hastings L.J. 73, 116-17 (2007).
60. Thomas Hobbes provided a dispassionate look at this debate.
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would
be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need
and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present,
or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace;
but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines
the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their
true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 63 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge U. Press 1991).
61. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra n. 43, at 454.
62. See e.g. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra n. 43.
63. E.g. N.M. Cattle Growers Assn. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding the Endangered Species Act required Fish & Wildlife Service to "conduct a full analysis of all of the
economic impacts of a critical habitat designation, regardless of whether those impacts are attributable co-
extensively to other causes").
64. The Endangered Species Act provides a memorable example of a statute that rejects cost-benefit
analysis in the environmental sphere. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S 153, 154, 194-95 (1978) (finding that
the legislative history clearly revealed that in enacting Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, "Congress
intended to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction-whatever the cost," and stating that "[o]ur
individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is
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the use of the methodology exists in application of common law and statutory law. Thus,
difficult questions exist regarding when to incorporate cost-benefit analysis in applying a
statute or common law doctrine in the situation of silence on the issue of balancing
interests.
Explicit empirical and theoretical study of the parameters and effects of the use of
cost-benefit analysis deserves attention before the wide area of discretionary use of cost-
benefit analysis should be implemented. Taking the purpose of the statute into
consideration is a necessary first step in interpreting the reach of the statute and the role
for cost-benefit analysis-as Professor Sunstein notes in Cost-Benefit Analysis without
Analyzing Costs or Benefits.6 5 For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,66 the
Supreme Court noted that the role of the court is not to evaluate the wisdom of laws but
to apply the judgments of the legislature consistent with legitimate policies. 6 7
One might... say[] that in this case the burden on the public through the loss of millions
of unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter. But neither
the Endangered Species Act nor Art. III of the Constitution provides federal courts with
authority to make such fine utilitarian calculations. On the contrary, the plain language of
the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value
of endangered species as "incalculable." Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court
to balance the loss of a sum certain-even $100 million-against a congressionally
declared "incalculable" value, even assuming we had the power to engage in such a
weighing process, which we emphatically do not.
68
Similarly, in Lead Industrial Assn. v. EPA,69 the D.C. Circuit rejected the
argument that the EPA should consider a cost-benefit analysis in setting air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act, noting that "the statute and its legislative history
make clear that economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambient air
quality standards under Section 109 [of the Clean Air Act].
' 70
By contrast, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that agencies
consider cost and benefits of federal projects, including environmental costs and benefits.
NEPA does not require a monetized cost-benefit analysis, however. It is the monetizing
of life that is most troubling to scholars critical of cost-benefit analysis. Unlike Section 7
of the Endangered Species Act or the Clean Air Act, NEPA does not require that
environmental values trump economic values. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Act as procedural rather than substantive, meaning that while agencies must consider the
costs and benefits of a project, the Act does not require that the agencies adopt the most
cost effective project.7 1 The regulations that implement NEPA requirements indicate
to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor
are we vested with the power of veto.").
65. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1898-99.
66. 437 U.S. 153.
67. Id. at 187-88.
68. Id. (footnote omitted).
69. 647 F.2d 1130.
70. Id. at 1148 (finding "totally without merit" the argument that promulgation of ambient air quality
standards for lead should consider economic or technological feasibility in setting the air quality standards).
71. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 541 (1978).
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that cost-benefit analysis can be used in agency considerations under NEPA.7 2
Nevertheless, because NEPA has been determined to set procedural rather than
substantive requirements, a negative cost-benefit analysis would not necessarily mean
that an agency studying a project would necessarily abandon the project. 73
Few statutes require a monetized cost-benefit analysis. In Risk Regulation at Risk,
Professors Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman find that "[o]nly two of the
twenty-two" major health, safety and environmental statutes relied on a cost-benefit test
as the statutory standard. 74 Even in cases where it is clear that cost-benefit analysis is
allowed or required in a particular legal inquiry, the scope and angle of the analysis is
often open to different interpretations, just as statutes are open to interpretation under the
traditional interpretation. In fact, a prudential balancing that is available for non-
monetized costs and benefits often fulfills the statutory goals. While this point is not
particularly surprising, it raises questions about claims that cost-benefit analysis is a
dependably useful process in judicial or agency decision making. Difficult questions
exist relating to the place of cost-benefit analysis in our jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
some points relating to the issue are clear. Laws sometimes require and sometimes
restrict the use of the tool of cost-benefit analysis. Judges abide by statutory and case
law restrictions in determining not only the reach and purpose of the law but also in
determining the role for cost-benefit analysis. As is frequently the case in law, the
debate exists in the silence, the part of the statute or law left to judicial or agency
discretion. Courts use judgment regarding decisions in this lacuna. The bookends of
decision are clear: When the law requires cost-benefit analysis, judges must apply it, but
when it prohibits such analysis, courts must refrain from it. The debate on cost-benefit
analysis focuses on this area of discretion. The area is broad and the debate channels
long-standing conceptions about the role of law, as well as different conceptions of the
best use of the law as a means of protecting the public or facilitating economic
enterprise.
IV. PROFESSOR SUNSTEIN'S COST-BENEFIT LESSONS: ASKING THE REAL QUESTIONS
In Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, Professor Sunstein suggested lessons
for the application of cost-benefit analysis. 75  He emphasized the importance of
identifying the "real questions" in comparing costs and benefits and interests, and shared
principles of his view of cost-benefit analysis. 76  Professor Sunstein argued that the
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2008). The regulation states that "[i]f a cost-benefit analysis relevant to the
choice among environmentally different alternatives is being considered for the proposed action, it shall be
incorporated by reference or appended to the statement as an aid in evaluating the environmental
consequences." Id.
73. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (holding that "once
an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure
that the agency has considered the environmental consequences").
74. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a Pragmatic Approach
40 (Stan. L. & Pol. 2003).
75. Sunstein, supra n. 12.
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requirement of reasonable accommodation under the ADA should include emotional
harm and stigma to the disabled employee. 77 In Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department
ofAdministration,78 Judge Posner dealt with the reasonable accommodation requirement
of the ADA. While Professor Sunstein agreed with Judge Posner's view that the
"reasonable accommodation" mandate of the ADA requires application of a cost-benefit
analysis, he found the judge's decision failed to fully accomplish this purpose. 79
In his article, Professor Sunstein demonstrates the central role of the law in
measuring and comparing interests. The underlying premise of Sunstein's argument is
that comparisons of legal interests is crucial to legal judgments. 80 As the title of the
piece suggests, Professor Sunstein concludes that Judge Posner failed to assess costs and
benefits sufficiently: "In the very case in which Judge Posner established that a kind of
cost-benefit analysis lies at the heart of the requirement of reasonable accommodation,
he did not analyze costs and benefits, and he certainly made no systematic effort to
compare the two."
8 1
Part of the message of the article involved a challenge to the conventional wisdom
that cost-benefit analysis offers a means of making decisions that are less susceptible to
indeterminacy and value judgments.
The plaintiff in Vande Zande was paralyzed from the waist down. 82 She requested
that the employer lower a sink in the kitchenette in her work place so that she could
reach it from her wheelchair. The cost to lower the sink on the floor where plaintiff
worked was approximately $150. The cost to lower the sinks throughout the building
was approximately $2,000. Plaintiff also sought an accommodation to allow her to work
at her home when pressure ulcers made it impossible for her to work at the office.
83
After agreeing with Judge Posner that the "'reasonable accommodation"' standard of the
ADA requires cost-benefit analysis, 84 Sunstein noted that his analysis departed from that
of Judge Posner on the question of what is an undue hardship on an employer who is
asked to provide an accommodation, stating that while the burden might be considered
"in the abstract," 85 it might also be viewed "in relationship to the benefits of the
accommodation." 86 Professor Sunstein identified the real question under this approach
as "whether the requested accommodation would be well-tailored to the disability in
question."87 He faulted Judge Posner's decision for failing to spend sufficient time
considering the "text, history, or structure of the ADA" and for failing to "carefully
77. Id.
78. 44 F.3d 538.
79. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1895 (stating that "[t]he problem with Judge Posner's analysis is that it does
not seriously investigate either costs or benefits").
80. Id. at 1900 (explaining that "it would seem quite odd to say that an accommodation will be deemed
,reasonable' only if an employee is willing to pay an amount that exceeds, or is at least proportional to, the
costs incurred by the employer").
81. Id. at 1905.
82. 44 F.3d at 543.
83. Id. at 543-46.
84. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1901.
85. Id. at 1898.
86. Id. (citing Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543).
87. Id. at 1898.
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analyze the conventional sources of interpretation" to determine the proper application of
the statute. 88 He also questioned whether it is "clear that the statutory term 'reasonable,'
in the context of a ban on disability discrimination, should be taken in the same way as
the concept in tort law."
89
Discussing the important virtues and vices of cost-benefit analysis, Professor
Sunstein noted that finding "[t]he proper measurement of those costs poses serious
challenges." 9 Professor Sunstein notes benefits and risks inherent in the cost-benefit
analysis process in the context of the ADA:
As we shall see, cost-benefit balancing has some important virtues .... It helps to expose
the fact that a failure to accommodate a disabled person may stem from habit or prejudice;
it properly focuses attention on the issue of potential benefits to the disabled person and
potential costs to the employer; and it disciplines intuitions that may be insufficiently
anchored in reality. But at least as practiced within the judiciary, cost-benefit analysis also
has potential vices. It can operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of
disciplining them, and it can fail to take account of an important aspect of discrimination,
consisting of the daily humiliations of exclusion and stigmatization.
9 1
Sunstein's evaluation of Judge Posner's decision depends on a judgment regarding
what "is "sensible to think that a hardship on the employer"92 and whether it is to be
judged to be due or "'undue' . . . in the abstract" or "in relationship to the benefits of the
accommodation." 93  Professor Suhstein's point applies to the cost-benefit analysis
process generally. Clearly, the methodology of cost-benefit analysis is subject to
considerable range. The process leaves open the scope and comparison of the analysis.
"A standard difficulty with cost-benefit analysis is that it may neglect costs and benefits
that are not easily measured. The emotional barriers to full integration are certainly
difficult to turn into monetary equivalents, or otherwise to use for purposes of formal or
informal cost-benefit analysis." 
94
Professor Sunstein's analysis reveals that cost-benefit analysis is far from value
free. The judge or regulator applying it must determine what factors to measure, weigh,
and compare in the given legal context. Professor Sunstein questioned Judge Posner's
ruling in Vande Zande that it was unreasonable (not a "reasonable accommodation"
under the ADA) to require the lowering of the kitchenette sink to accommodate the
plaintiffs access to her workplace. 95 Professor Sunstein also questioned Judge Posner's
rejection of the plaintiffs claim for 16.5 hours of sick leave taken as a result of the
employer's failure to provide an at-home computer, which would have enabled her to
work 16.5 hours from home. 96 Professor Sunstein argued that Judge Posner failed to
fully recognize and value the emotional barriers to full integration of disabled workers in
88. Id. at 1898-99.
89. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1899.
90. Id. at 1896.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1898.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1903 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 1902-04.
96. Id. at 1904-05.
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the workplace, asserting that "stigmatic harms and daily humiliations deserve serious
attention as part of the inquiry into whether requested accommodations are
reasonable. . . ."97 Professor Sunstein argued for "the importance of seeing those daily
humiliations as imposing significant costs," because failing to consider such costs "does
a real disservice both to cost-benefit analysis and to the ADA."9 8 Accordingly, he notes
that "the removal of those harms and humiliations can create real benefits." 99  He
concluded that the cost-benefit process in this context "must attempt to measure and
include those benefits." 100 He identified the "real question" of the case under the ADA
by his view of the underlying goals of the ADA.10' Certainly, finding the real questions
is fundamental to effectuating the goals of law in any given circumstance. It is also
fundamental to understanding the role of judges, legislators, and regulators in facing the
important task of identifying the "real question" in other areas, especially those with
significant impact on public health and safety.
Noting the "[p]uzzles and [v]aluations" involved in the hard work of applying the
law, Sunstein raises numerous questions about whether benefits of accommodation must
"be turned into monetary equivalents" and whether such monetary figures should be
based on "willingness to pay."102 He asks the "even more puzzling question" of the
monetary value of not receiving the accommodation from the view of the disabled
person. 103  Professor Sunstein notes the oddness of deeming an accommodation
"'reasonable' only if an employee is willing to pay an amount that exceeds, or is at least
proportional to, the costs incurred by the employer." 104 He charges Judge Posner with
failing to address these important questions 10 5 and asserts that "emotional as well as
material harm" to the plaintiff should be included in the issue of reasonable
accommodations test because including these harms "would provide some discipline on
the inclination to trivialize, or alternatively to exaggerate, the emotional or stigmatic
harm of failures to accommodate."
10 6
Cost-benefit analysis cannot easily take [stigmatic] harms on board. But there is no
question that those harms greatly matter. People may be willing to pay a great deal to
avoid them, or demand a great deal not to be subjected to them .... It is plausible to say
that what most matters is welfare, not willingness to pay, and the willingness to pay of
disabled workers may not give a sufficient account of the welfare effects of stigma and
humiliation. There is no question that an adequate analysis of costs and benefits would
count expressive and symbolic harms, because their welfare effects are real and sometimes
large. 107
Here, Professor Sunstein's recognition of the "standard difficulty" in cost-benefit
97. Id. at 1895.
98. Id. at 1896.
99. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1895.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1898-99.
102. Id. at 1899 (footnote omitted).
103. Id.
104. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1900.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1903.
107. Id. at 1909.
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analysis of neglecting "costs and benefits that are not easily measured" 1° 8 is similar to
that of scholars critical of cost-benefit analysis such as Professor McGarity who
documents the problem of "conflat[ing] information and values that cannot easily be
incorporated into the benefit analyses."
109
Professor Sunstein objects to Judge Posner's ruling that an employer does not have
"a duty to expend even modest amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in
working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers,"' calling it "a
conclusion, not an argument." 110 He criticized Judge Posner's move to assume rather
than to decide the cost of "emotional barriers to full integration into the workplace,"
1 II
and he argues that courts should assess fully the real costs of inconvenience and
humiliation. 112
With respect to the lowering of the sink, Vande Zande had two concerns. The first was
practical. If the goal is to wash a coffee cup, or to get a drink of water, it is probably most
pleasant and convenient to be able to use a kitchenette, not the bathroom. The second
involved stigma. If most people are able to use the sink in the kitchenette, it is not merely
convenient to be able to use that sink; worse, it is stigmatizing and in a way humiliating to
have to use the bathroom instead. 113
Professor Sunstein concluded that Judge Posner's failure to fully assess the costs to
the plaintiff trivialized her interests.
Judge Posner trivialized these concerns. But for an employee, the use of the sink, in the
kitchenette on her or his floor, may be a matter of daily routine, and it is no light thing to
have to resort to the place in which employees generally do other sorts of things (not to put
too fine a point on it). To this extent, the harm in Vande Zande was expressive and
symbolic. 114
Professor Sunstein notes the broader implications of the questions he raises. "The
broader point is that even if measurement is difficult, a failure to consider that harm is
not defensible." 115 Moreover, he notes that a "standard difficulty" in cost-benefit
analysis is that it may neglect factors "not easily measured," including "[t]he emotional
barriers to full integration" in society.
116
Professor Sunstein charged Judge Posner (the father of the economics in law
movement) with "casual empiricism" and with failing to "seriously ask the questions
that, on his view, the statute required." 1 17 Thus, Professor Sunstein does not blink at the
difficulties involved in cost-benefit analysis. "[C]ost-benefit analysis might incorporate
108. Id. at 1903 (footnote omitted).
109. McGarity, supra n. 44, at 58 (footnote omitted) (noting that "[w]hen information or values arise that
cannot easily be factored into the benefit models, the modelers often simply ignore them. In this way, modelers
tend to 'dwarf soft variables' like emotional distress and concern for the well-being of endangered species.")
(footnote omitted).
110. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1902 (footnote omitted).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1908.
114. Id. at 1908-09.
115. Id. at 1903-04 (footnote omitted).
116. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1903 (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 1905.
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intuitions rather than disciplining them. Without a method for calculating costs or
benefits, analysts are likely to rely on their own hunches and speculations."
118
Among the lessons Sunstein drew from his review of the case included the "need
to know much more about how juries handle questions submitted to them under the
ADA." 119 He notes that "Judge Posner calls for a rough proportionality test" rather than
a true cost-benefit analysis.
120
A signal virtue of some kind of weighing of costs and benefits is that it can demonstrate
that erroneous intuitions, or hostility and prejudice, are beneath the surface. How much of
a burden would have been imposed by eight weeks of telecommuting? Why not lower
sinks to thirty-four inches, so that they can be used by people with wheelchairs--especially
if the cost is usually around $150? An advantage of an inquiry into costs and benefits, and
of a comparison of the two, is that it makes it possible to test intuitions, and practices, by
reference to reality.
12 1
Professor Sunstein concluded that Judge Posner's analysis in the Vande Zande case
on the issue of working at home by telecommuting as an accommodation under the ADA
was "brisk, conclusory, and inadequate." 122  He found the judge's treatment of the
accommodation of lowering one or more sinks to be "brief, conclusory, and quite
unconvincing." 123  In considering the "puzzle" of the judge's failure to be "more
systematic," Professor Sunstein speculates that two problems may lead to such a
result. 124 First, he notes that cost-benefit analysis may sometimes "incorporate intuitions
rather than disciplining them,"' 125 leading to "hunches and speculations," 126 which "may
be a product of some kind of prejudice,... not of bigotry, but of an insufficiently
reflective belief that standard workplace practices ... are entirely reasonable." 27 In the
case of insufficient information, judicial hunches, and intuitions, Professor Sunstein
concludes that rather than curing the underlying problem, cost-benefit analysis
"incorporates and perpetuates that problem."' 128 Despite his significant critique for the
reasoning used in the opinion and his criticism of the cost-benefit analysis process in the
Vande Zande case, Professor Sunstein's general conclusion in the article is one of
commendation for the cost-benefit analysis process: "A great virtue of cost-benefit
analysis, or a proportionality test, is that it puts the resistance to its proof. It should be
clear that a competent cost-benefit analysis calls for attention to the benefits to the
118. Id. at 1908.
119. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1906 (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 1907. This point has additional significance given Judge Posner's recent endorsement of
expanded use of cost-benefit analysis in the common law context and as a tool for judges in general. See
generally Posner, supra n. 35.
121. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1907.




126. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1908 (reminding readers of "Judge Posner's casual empiricism with respect to
telecommuting, [and] his suggestion that workers need to perform in teams with supervisors, lest their
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employee, not simply to the employer, of requested accommodations."
129
As is clear with all decision-making, the devil is in the detail of competent
application. While Sunstein notes the need to recognize that both "intractable intuitions"
and "stigmatic harm" 130 can undermine any cost-benefit analysis, his conclusion sweeps
away the difficulties of the reality of application of cost-benefit analysis. "An advantage
of an inquiry into costs and benefits, and of a comparison of the two, is that it makes it
possible to test intuitions, and practices, by reference to reality."'13 1 This conclusion
involves some optimism, focusing on the ideal of cost-benefit analysis rather than its
actual application. The choice of cost-benefit analysis as the methodology does not
guarantee full assessment of costs.
IV. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In Climate Change Justice, Professors Sunstein and Eric Posner counter the
argument that the U.S. should bear substantial portions of the costs of climate change
mitigation under theories of distributive and corrective justice. 132 They assert the
tremendous economic cost that would be borne by the United States, minimal risk from
climate change, and relatively little, if any, benefit. 133 Because China and India, and
other developing countries are able to produce cheaper goods, many feared that the
United States would be at a competitive disadvantage if it agreed to the Kyoto Protocol.
A unanimous resolution in the Senate urged a refusal to ratify.134 Of course national
policy is not created in a political vacuum. Legislators are influenced by the public, and
interest groups, and many groups have been vocal in support of the Kyoto Protocol.
Congress has begun to regard the issue of global climate change more seriously as a
result of growing public pressure. 135 After initially expressing reservations in the United
Nations meeting in Bali in December 2007, the United States advocated a comprehensive
treaty that could even include some mandatory standards. 136 The authors in Climate
Change Justice present this sentiment as the reason for the article.
Many people believe that the United States is required to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions beyond the point that is justified by its own self-interest, simply because the
United States is wealthy, and because the nations most at risk from climate change are
poor. This argument from distributive justice is complemented by an argument from
corrective justice: The existing "stock" of greenhouse gas emissions owes a great deal to
129. Id. at 1906-07 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 1908.
131. Id. at 1907.
132. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16.
133. Id. at 1565.
134. See Sen. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (July 25, 1997).
135. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislation
Proposal Is "Best"? 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 123 (2007). Additionally, United States policy is
undergoing a shift in its recognition of the problem. See e.g. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, The Road
Map from Bali: Part 1, 239 N.Y. Li. 3 (Feb. 22, 2008); Rosanne Skirble, Prospects Improve for U.S. Global
Warming Law (Voice of Am. Jan. 31, 2008) (radio broadcast) (noting presence of U.S. leadership in the United
Nations meeting in Bali in Dec. 2007) (available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-
01-3 1-voa28.cfm?CFID=89935400&CFTOKEN=86752463).
136. Kass & McCarroll, supra n. 135.
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the past actions of the United States, and many people think that the United States should
do a great deal to reduce a problem for which it is disproportionately responsible 1 37
In this article, Professors Sunstein and Eric Posner assess "standard arguments
from distributive and corrective justice" and find that these arguments "fail to provide
strong justifications for imposing special obligations for greenhouse gas reductions on
the United States. ' 138 This statement uses the demanding test of "strong justification" to
frame the burden of proof issue. However, suggesting that corrective or distributive
justice is the sole motivator of U.S. energy policy seems frivolous. No one suggests that
a program is motivated solely by corrective and distributive justice considerations.
Rather, the primary motivation for such a plan is found in combating the physical effects
of greenhouse gas. Although the authors start from the premise that nations are not
moral agents, they ultimately sign on to the idea of significant U.S. participation in a
carbon reduction effort based on a welfare principle. 139 The purpose of Climate Change
Justice appears not to be to defeat a greenhouse gas reduction agreement, but rather to
deny scholars and policymakers one argument for this ultimate outcome.
If the United States agrees to participate in a climate change agreement on terms
that are not in the nation's interest, but that help the world as a whole, there would be no
reason to object, certainly if such participation is more helpful to poor nations than
conventional foreign-aid alternatives. Compared to continued inaction, participation on
those terms would be entirely commendable. But the commendation should not be
muddied by resort to crude arguments from distributive and corrective justice. 140
The focus of Climate Change Justice is not on the policy outcome; it is not about
whether to enter a treaty on greenhouse gas reduction; rather, it seeks to defeat appeals to
corrective and distributive justice as part of the analysis. 141
In a recent article, Professor Daniel Farber responds to these arguments, asserting
"that the United States has a moral obligation to be accountable for its contribution to the
climate change problem," and sets forth a possible "mechanism for providing climate
change compensation." 142 Farber explores arguments against such responsibility, noting
that the issue is far from academic since developing countries are making demands for
compensation for global climate change and continuing greenhouse gas emissions. 143
137. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1565.
138. Id.
139. Posner& Sunstein, supra n. 16.
140. Id. at 1611-12.
141. Despite their criticism of the corrective justice rationale for carbon reduction, the authors ultimately
agree with the policy of carbon reduction. Their attack depends on an all-or-nothing application of corrective
justice as a standalone goal rather than assessing corrective justice as one of the cumulative positive effects of
carbon reduction. Investment of significant scholarly effort to attack a rationale while agreeing with the policy
of seems non-utilitarian, even inefficient. The article's conclusion provides a clue to the utility of the attack
from the perspective of the authors. The conclusion refocuses on the central issue of the moral authority of
nations. In their final sentence, the authors note that the article defeated "influential arguments in a way that
might bear not only on climate change, but also on a wide range of other questions raised when some nations
make claims on others." Id. at 1612. Remembering the premise that nations are not moral agents suggests that
such other questions include arguments that governments bear responsibility for their actions.
142. Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a
Complex World, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 377, 379.
143. Id. at 380. Farber rejects the argument that because the U.S. is not the independent cause of the harm of
global climate change, it is somehow free from responsibility. Similarly, he rejects the claim that because U.S.
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Farber also adds evidence to the numbers provided by Posner and Sunstein to establish
the disproportionate role of U.S. to the physical phenomenon of global climate change
144
and makes the "moral case for compensation," 145 noting that "[c]ompensation for harm
caused by unreasonable conduct is, after all, one of the key purposes of our tort
system." 146 Farber relies on traditional tort doctrine, including the established example
of harm caused by "two simultaneous negligent fires ' 147 in which courts consistently
hold both actors liable. Applying the analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 14 8 Farber finds that the argument against corrective justice in this
context "greatly exaggerates both the need for precision in matching victims and
compensators and the degree to which compensation would impose burdens on wholly
innocent parties." 14 9  Farber also raises the possibility that a "more tailored"
compensation mechanism could be devised.15 0
Professor Farber's discussion also employs a cost-benefit comparison of whether
"the emissions causing activity resulted in greater harm than benefit to global social
welfare." 15 1 Although he asserts that nations themselves "should be considered to have
moral rights and responsibilities," he does not rely on this assertion to make his case for
moral responsibility for emissions. 152 Farber presents the strict and retroactive liability
compensation system of CERCLA as legal "precedent for a rigorous cost-recovery
system.' 153 On the question of whether reductions of carbon emissions would present a
distribution of wealth from the U.S. to poor nations, Farber demonstrates the power of
framing often noted by Professor Sunstein, disputing the assertion that such reductions
by the U.S. would constitute a redistribution of wealth only "if unrestricted emission-
and therefore, unlimited climate change-is considered to be the baseline." 154 He flips
the analysis by adjusting the baseline.
Compared to this baseline of unrestricted emissions, restricting emissions makes poor
countries better off and costs rich countries money, so it can be considered a redistribution
"contribution[s] to climate change will [soon] be swamped by China," the U.S. is relieved from responsibility
for harm to the global climate. Id. at 387-88.
144. Id. at 386. Farber emphasizes the importance of the historical contributions to global climate change
and addresses the more serious moral question of "the extent of responsibility for causing climate change." Id.
at 397.
145. Farber, supra n. 142, at 388.
146. Id. at 387. See also Farber, supra n. 6, at 1641; Eric Neumayer, In Defence of HistoricalAccountability
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 33 Ecological Econ. 185, 187 (2000).
147. Farber, supran. 142, at 391.
148. Id. at 401-03 (analyzing Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
149. Id. at 397. Agreeing with Posner and Sunstein that "it is not possible to precisely match the burden of
compensation with individual fault," Farber nonetheless argues that despite uncertainty, the match of cause and
harm is sufficient under traditional legal principles to find the U.S. liable. Id. at 388.
150. Id. at 397 (noting the need to "hesitate before we accept the demands for such a high level of precision.
We live in a much more complex world where harms lack the simplicity of automobile collisions. If we
demand a high level of precision to establish a moral claim, we also render morality irrelevant to the most
serious harms created by modem society.").
151. Farber, supra n. 142, 397-98.
152. Id. at 400. Finding "the collective responsibility ... irrelevant to the question of whether the United
States has a duty to reduce future emissions," Farber emphasizes the responsibility of shareholders and voters
to control these larger actors. Id. (footnote omitted).
153. Id. at4l.
154. Id. at 404.
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of wealth. If, instead, we consider the baseline to be a world in which climate is stable,
then the shoe is on the other foot. Starting with that baseline, we would say that the United
States and other wealthy emitters are redistributing income to themselves at the expense of
poor countries by their ongoing damage to the planetary climate system.
155
Professor Farber answers the moral and legal questions arguments raised in
Climate Change Justice. Other questions remain, however, about how to configure cost-
benefit analysis approaching legal and policy decisions. In Climate Change Justice, the
authors provide extensive the numbers on carbon emissions of different countries.
156
The authors demonstrate that past actions of the United States are responsible for the
"stock" of greenhouse gas emissions currently in the atmosphere. 157 Nevertheless, they
conclude that actions by the United States to reduce greenhouse gases beyond levels
indicated by national self-interest do not deserve recognition under the concept of
distributive justice because nations are not moral agents and because distribution of
money to poor people is better than reductions of greenhouse gases, as a matter of
corrective and distributive justice. 158
The current stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a result of the behavior of
people living in the past. Much of it is due to the behavior of people who are dead. The
basic problem for corrective justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot be punished or held
responsible for their behavior, or forced to compensate those they have harmed. 1
59
In the end, all three scholars agree on the need to address global climate change as
a matter of social welfare. In Climate Change Justice, the authors conclude by stating:
If the United States agrees to participate in a climate change agreement on terms that are
not in the nation's interest, but that help the world as a whole, there would be no reason to
object, certainly if such participation is more helpful to poor nations than conventional
foreign-aid alternatives. Compared to continued inaction, participation on those terms
would be entirely commendable. But the commendation should not be muddied by resort
to crude [and unhelpful] arguments from distributive and corrective justice. 160
Thus, the policy issue is not the area of dispute. Rather, the disputed area involves
whether justice arguments are available in this and other policy areas. The authors do
not object to programs of greenhouse gas reductions by the U.S. that would have the
effect of helping other nations:
As compared to the status quo, or to an agreement that requires all nations to freeze their
155. Farber, supra n. 142, at 404.
156. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1579.
157. Id.
158. Robert E. Scott, The China Trade Toll: Widespread Wage Suppression, 2 Million Jobs Lost in the U.S.
(Econ. Policy Inst. Briefing Paper No. 219) (published July 30, 2008) (available at
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bp219) (documenting lost wages of more than $19 billion in 2007 and U.S.
trade deficit with China that has grown from $84 billion in 2001 to $262 billion in 2007).
159. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1593. As a larger take-away point, the authors also note that their
claim "has general implications for thinking about [both] distributive and corrective justice [arguments] in the
context of international law and international agreements." Id. at 1573. The implication of the hard definitions
of corrective and distributive justice employed by the authors is that no government action or policy can attain
the moral high ground of the category as construed, which appears to be limited to judicial causes of action for
past injuries.
160. Id. at 1611-12.
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emissions at existing levels, it is better, from the standpoint of distributive justice, for the
United States to join an agreement in which it agrees to provide technological or financial
assistance to poor nations, and it may even be better, from that standpoint, to scale back
emissions more than domestic self-interest would dictate. 
16 1
The non-utilitarian aspect of investing effort to defeat not an outcome but rather a
particular justice argument rests on the principled argument against muddying the debate
with ideas about justice. Despite the work of assembling empirical data to establish the
dominance of U.S. contributions in the past and the likelihood that China will "swamp"
U.S. contributions in the future, the argument of Climate Change Justice rests primarily
on non-empirical assertions: (1) the difficulty of matching victims with wrongdoers
makes the corrective and distributive justice model a poor fit to this issue; (2) reducing
greenhouse gas is a less perfect remedy than giving cash to victims, and (3) nations are
collections of people rather than moral agents.
A. Framing Decisions
The authors start from "admittedly controversial assumptions." 162 The first of
these is "the world, taken as a whole, would benefit from an agreement to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions." 163 The second is that "some nations, above all the United
States (and China as well), might not benefit, on net, from the agreement that would be
optimal from the world's point of view." 164 The analysis proceeds to take a cost-benefit
analysis that compares not the costs and benefits to the actor in question (the U.S.), but
rather the costs and benefits to the entire world.165 The argument, thus, concludes that
"the standard resolution of the problem is clear: The world should enter into the optimal
agreement, and the United States should be given side-payments in return for its
participation.",
166
The ordinary framing of cost-benefit analysis proceeds from the perspective of the
costs and benefits that accrue to the decision maker. The cumulative approach of
Climate Change Justice rejects this orientation for a framework in which the effects to
the world are compared with the effects on each nation. 167  The inquiry seeks to
"establish the complex relationship between the interests of the world, taken as a whole,
and the interests of the United States." 168 This framework is far from standard cost-
benefit analysis, however. It reconfigures the typical comparison of costs and benefits,
pitching the analysis from a world view and, thus, drawing the analysis into a tragedy of
the commons dilemma in which no actor can respond effectively. Is the world-wide
view of interests the standard resolution of cost-benefit analysis? Ordinary cost-benefit
analysis assesses costs and all benefits that flow to the decision maker. The fact that
some other party will benefit is not ordinarily included as a detriment to the decision
161. Id. at 1591.
162. Id. at 1568.
163. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1568 (footnote omitted).
164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1568-69.
166. Id. at 1569 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 1573.
168. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1573.
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maker. Rendering an external benefit as a detriment to the decision-maker requires
justification. Internalizing external benefits as detriments flips the ordinary calculus.
Framing the issue as one for consideration of the world focuses the inquiry at a level
disconnected from the decision-maker involved (the United States). No supranational
decision-maker is available to implement the results of the analysis. The normative
judgment drawn from this framework lacks a decision maker. Does the test mean that
the decision-maker fears that, without a hard-line stance, other countries are less likely to
carry a share of the cost of carbon reduction? Does this approach overvalue
confrontation on the part of the U.S. and undervalue its ability to galvanize support
among nations for a common goal? If this is the justification, it seems to require a
complex analysis of risks of coercion or threats by the U.S. Moreover, the analysis
appears to discard reputational considerations and the possible benefits of collaborating
with the international community. The flavor of this approach is reminiscent of the Cold
War or nuclear buildup in which "psyching" out the other party is part of the calculation.
To return to the ordinary framing of cost-benefit analysis, take an example from
the commonplace perspective of an individual. Suppose that you would benefit from the
tax break associated with donating used clothing and furniture to charity. In other words,
the tax benefit to you is greater than the value you place on the items. Is the fact that
others might benefit more than the decision-maker relevant? If one figures that the
benefit to the poor people who would receive the contributed items actually exceeds the
benefit to you, does this result in a cost-benefit decision against the contribution?
Perhaps a better indicator of winners and losers would be data on the major corporations
that benefit by exporting manufacturing away from countries that have more stringent
environmental regulations and higher wages for workers. The corporations and their
shareholders may be clearer beneficiaries than the loose collection of people formed into
nations, many of whom do not recognize benefit from the export of manufacturing.
Another inquiry would relate to the consumers of the developed countries, including the
U.S., who arguably benefit by the export of manufacturing to China. They get lower cost
consumer goods and cleaner skies. There might be detriments to be included in such a
calculation as well, such as loss of jobs to foreign operations. Dramatic examples are
apparent in the rust belt and in the many small towns and small businesses that do not see
the export of production to China as a net benefit to them. Is the relevant question the
output of greenhouse gases from a particular geographical area such as China? Does it
matter to the analysis that a significant portion of the greenhouse gas production results
from pollution by proxy by Western companies that have moved manufacturing facilities
from the U.S. to Asia?
16 9
169. Just as Professor Sunstein identified the "real question" of reasonable accommodations under the ADA
by reference to its underlying goals, finding the real questions in climate change policy is central to a correct
assessment of the interests. Perhaps the real question is whether greenhouse gas reduction effects are
consistent with corrective and distributive justice, rather than whether its goals are solely directed at corrective
and distributive justice. The central principle of note is that "nations are not people; they are collections of
people." Id. at 1571. Nonetheless, the authors treat nations as individual entities in assessing self-interest;
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B. Nations as Amoral Actors
In Climate Change Justice, the authors start from an assertion as opposed to an
assumption: nations are not moral agents. "[N]ations are not people; they are collections
of people." 170 The point receives emphasis in the article:
N"ations are not individuals: they do not have mental states and cannot, except
metaphorically, act. Blame must ordinarily be apportioned to individuals, and it
is hard to blame all greenhouse gas-emitters for wrongful behavior, especially
those from the past who are partly responsible for the current stock of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. 
171
Nevertheless, the article treats nations as individual winners and losers in the
carbon contest, based on their production of carbon and production of goods, giving the
metaphor of individual action real application in assessing national self-interest. The real
question seems not to be the moral status of nations but their positions relative to each
other in terms of GNP and other economic factors. If this data is relevant, we are
treating the nations as agents, if not moral agents, with reasons for choosing, and a
relevant question seems to be whether the success of some actor-nations deprives others
of success and whether the ability or willingness to pay for uneven benefits is relevant to
the inquiry.
Two different conceptualizations of nations have significance. First, Climate
Change Justice treats nations as entities-rational actors who assess their own self-
interest as a single entity. Second, nations are treated as a collection of individuals with
their own self-interests-many of which may conflict with that of other individuals and
groups inside the nation. Both conceptualizations may be useful in assessing policy, but
the rule of consistent measurement suggests that arguments cannot switch from one to
the other conception without a justifiable reason for the shift. The flat assertion that
nations lack status as moral actors raises a of myriad questions. Is the United States
involved in fraudulent representations when it calls on other nations to aspire to better
records on human rights on the basis of moral authority? Or, not being a moral actor,
can the U.S. use it exhortations of moral authority with impunity? Put this concept
together with the device of assuming rather than deciding and troubling puzzles persist.
If torture serves our public interest is it justifiable because it serves the perceived self-
interest? Can a nation rely on its status as a non-moral actor when the actions it takes are
destructive to others? Is there a need to attempt to justify torture once the concept of
nations as amoral actors receives acceptance?
C. Goals, Effects, and Money: The Perfect Is Enemy of the Good
The authors argue against the distributive theory of justice in the greenhouse gas
debate on the ground that it does not meet the burden of establishing it is the best means
of distribution, asserting that even assuming that redistribution from rich nations to poor
nations is desirable, "it is not at all clear that it should take the particular form of a deal
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1572.
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in which the United States joins an agreement that is not in its interest."' 172 Framing the
issue as an all-or-nothing test-rather than one element in the benefits of greenhouse gas
reductions-isolates the issue of justice as a single test, requiring that justice is the sole
intent of the action. 173 "[G]reenhouse gas reductions are a crude and somewhat puzzling
way of attempting to achieve redistributive goals."' 174 Also central to the Climate
Control Justice argument is a requirement that collective and distributive justice exists
only when monetary awards are given to affected individuals. The argument presents
corrective and distributive justice as goals (rather than desirable effects) and faults the
system that fails to perfect the goal of monetary damages. "If the United States wants to
assist poor nations, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to be the best
way for it to accomplish that goal."' 175 This approach not only identifies collective and
distributive justice as a goal rather than an effect, it also rejects any solution other than
giving money to the victims. The framework determines the result. Under this
approach, collective and distributive justice must be the sole goal rather than another
desirable effect of greenhouse gas reductions. It, thus, presents an example of the old
saying "the perfect is enemy of the good."
The article's application of cost-benefit analysis of the interests is vulnerable to
some of the criticisms that Professor Sunstein pointed out in his critique of Judge
Posner's cost-benefit analysis in the ADA context.176 Attention to four areas illustrates
the flex in cost-benefit analysis as practiced by scholars and judges: (1)Is the world as a
whole the framework for comparison or should the analysis compare costs and benefits
to individual nations who are deciding policy actions? (i.e., setting the scope or
framework of cost and benefits); (2) What are the goals vs. effects?; (3) Does the
analysis treat nations as collectives or as collections of individuals?; (4) Does the balance
include all costs or sequester and elevate a factor, requiring the perfect remedy of money
for example?
Ultimately, the authors accept the merits of entering a reduction a matter of welfare
and policy. "We do not question the proposition that an international agreement to
control greenhouse gases, with American participation, is justified, and all things
172. Id. at 1584.
173. In Climate Change and Animals, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1695 (2007), Professors Sunstein and Wayne
Hsiung apply the same all-or-nothing approach to the issue of species loss from climate change. The authors
derive a dollar value for the expected loss to Americans from species extinctions resulting from climate change.
They suggest that climate change policy should take into account nonhuman life and the suffering and death of
animals that will result from climate change. Id. at 1740. By multiplying the number of species projected to be
lost from climate change by the estimated dollar loss per species, they estimate that the global warming
induced species loss could cost Americans between $162 and $399 billion per year, or 1.4% to 3.5% of GDP.
Weighing the cost of compliance with the Kyoto protocol with the benefit of avoiding the loss of animal life,
they conclude that despite the significant costs of species loss, "[t]he net value of the treaty for the world ... is
still negative, at -$77 billion annually, given the heavy U.S. costs." Id. at 1736. While they argue that people
should care about the suffering that climate change will inflict upon animals, they do not present a cumulative
cost-benefit analysis of the issue of positive and negative effects of Kyoto that includes the effects on animals.
This presents the same sort of all-or-nothing approach used in Climate Change Justice. The benefits of
alleviating the suffering flow to the animals themselves and also to humans by virtue of an array of advantages,
including but not limited to, our self-regard as moral agents.
174. Posner& Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1571.
175. Id. at 1572.
176. Sunstein, supra n. 12.
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considered, the United States should probably participate even if the domestic cost-
benefit analysis does not clearly justify such participation." 177 While the authors "favor
a welfarist approach to international questions," 178 the chosen framework of goals rather
than effects means that welfarist actions do not count in the cost-benefit scale. Thus, the
argument denies significance to welfarist actions and deprives greenhouse gas reduction
of any credit for collective and distributive justice effects. 179 At its base, this claim is
that emissions reductions are not the best way to achieve corrective justice. "Our only
claims are that the aggressive emissions reductions on the part of the United States are
not an especially effective method for transferring resources from wealthy people to poor
people, and that if this is the goal, many alternative policies would probably be
better." 180  This point fails to consider, however, the fact that other benefits of great
significance accrue from greenhouse gas reductions, such as arresting the rise of oceans
and the loss of wildlife. Just as emotional and stigmatic effects recognized by the ADA
deserve recognition, reputational and public perception concerns may lay claim to
consideration under the policy making of greenhouse gas reduction policy. 181 Investing
in the environment through protective measures preserves human and social capital. The
U.S. is looked to as a leader on issues from preservation of democracy to environmental
justice, creating the likelihood that difficulties of measuring exact self-interest will be
balanced by international goodwill generated by global benefits. Helping the developing
world move toward minimizing greenhouse gas-producing energy sources would save
the money for both the U.S. and other nations. Moreover, helping the developing nations
now is much less expensive than needing to help them convert from a greenhouse gas-
producing infrastructure in the future.
The numbers are irrelevant to the dominant argument, which relies on syllogistic
rather than empirical force. Whatever the numbers and assumptions, this mismatch
defeats the collective and distributive justice application, according to Posner and
Sunstein, because of its difficulty in identifying wrongdoers and matching them with
victims. The identity problem that arises as a result of the harm being inflicted by actors
in the past overwhelms the analysis. "[H]olding Americans today responsible for the
activities of their ancestors is not fair or reasonable on corrective justice grounds,
because current American's are not the relevant wrongdoers; they are not responsible for
the harm." 182 The syllogistic nature of the argument is obscured by the array of facts
and information the authors provide. Nevertheless, the fact that the force of the
argument is syllogistic rather than empirical is clear when one considers the analysis and
177. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1572 (footnotes omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. The authors also draw a larger principle from the analysis, finding that the difficulties in the climate
change context (nations are not people and money is the best solution to all problems of distributive and
corrective justice) has applicability to other areas such as reparations. Id.
180. Id. at 1591.
181. Public opinion perception is important in environmental issues. See, e.g. Adam Douglas Henry, Public
Perceptions of Global Warming, 7 Hum. Ecology Rev. 25 (2000); Paul M. Kellstedt, Sammy Zahran & Arnold
Vedlitz, Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes toward Global Warming and Climate
Change in the United States, 28 Risk Analysis 113 (2008); Willett Kempton, Will Public Environmental
Concern Lead to Action on Global Warming? 18 Annual Rev. Energy & Env. 217 (1993).
182. Posner & Sunstein, supra n. 16, at 1593.
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also the fact that starker numbers would not affect the article's argument. Making the
numbers even worse in terms of the imbalance of U.S. contributions-say 80% or
90%-of both stocks and flows of carbon would not affect the analysis. Increases in the
flow or stock of greenhouse gas attributable to the U.S. would not change the conclusion.
Stripped of numbers, the syllogism presents its essential argument: (1) collective and
distributive justice requires individual victims and individual wrongdoers; (2)
greenhouse gas reduction by the U.S. is not justice for individual victims by individual
defendants based on tort concepts; and (3) collective and distributive justice is not a good
fit for greenhouse gas reduction. A separate syllogism presents the requirement that
collective and distributive justice requires the remedy of direct payment to the
individuals harmed. And again, another syllogism asserts as a "given" that nations are
not moral entities and, thus, cannot be held accountable under moral standards. The
authors assert that the arguments for "corrective justice runs into the standard problems
that arise when collectivities, such as nations, are treated as moral agents: Many people
who have not acted wrongfully end up being forced to provide a remedy to many people
who have not been victimized." 
183
VI. CONCLUSION
Policy analysis impacts every aspect of modem life, including public health and
the sustainability of the planet-raising puzzles that even Shakespeare could not have
imagined. The growing reliance on cost-benefit analysis in judicial decision-making,
agency regulations, and scholarly analysis poses complicated comparisons and
competition of interests and values of economic enterprise on one hand and public health
and safety on the other. The efficacy of the tool of cost-benefit analysis, which has
increasing significance in today's legal world, depends on accurate measures and
comparisons.
The promise of finding a method that brings greater certainty to important
decisions holds great appeal. Significant questions exist regarding whether cost-benefit
analysis fulfills this promise, however. Modest variations or nudges of policy can, of
course, result in profound differences in the results of legal analysis. 184 Scholarship on
cost-benefit analysis reveals controversy regarding its use, including questions about
whether indeterminacy is decreased by the use of this analytical frame. Some
commentators and legal philosophers suggest that cost-benefit analysis presents a kind of
value judgment from the beginning-a perspective that efficiency, or a certain brand of
efficiency, loads the deck in favor of a laissezfaire approach and imports values into the
law that a statute had rejected or disciplined. Professor Sunstein's assertion that "cost-
benefit analysis ... can operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of
disciplining them"'185 provides a warning. Disagreements among preeminent scholars
and jurists provide dramatic examples of the need for rigor in the identification of
interests. Moreover, such disagreements underscore the indeterminacy of cost-benefit
183. Id. at 1565.
184. Sunstein, supra n. 12, at 1898 (noting that a "modest variation" of the test applied in the area would
make cost relevant).
185. Id. at 1896.
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analysis and suggest that a necessary preliminary step in using the process is the
identification of the interests at issue and, additionally, the law's weighting of those
interests. Professor Sunstein's explication of the profound differences in the
identification of the "real questions" in law and policy suggests a number of provisional
judgments. First, we need more empirical research into the way that lawmakers
(including legislators, regulators, and judges) and thought-leaders (such as executives
and scholars) marshal cost-benefit analysis.
In cases where cost-benefit analysis is available to judges or regulators, the
analysis of what questions are the "real questions" is by no means established by the
method. Just as reasonable minds can differ regarding the interpretation of statutes, they
can differ regarding the precise dimensions of the costs and benefits and analysis in any
given situation. Indeed, finding the right interpretation of the law for purposes of cost-
benefit analysis is very similar to the task of interpretation under traditional judicial
inquiry and under any prudential balancing of factors. While this point is not surprising
and is not a basis for rejecting cost-benefit analysis, it raises questions about value of
cost-benefit analysis in judicial or agency decision-making. The existence of an
economic template does not trump laws, and laws often include judgments about moral
choice. Economics does not deprive sources of law of the power to alter the cost-benefit
analysis. When a statute requires a balancing of costs and benefits, one of the costs
considered should be the regulatory process of counting those costs. Express vetting of
measures employed in cost-benefit analysis should be conscious and specific. Do the
benefits of using the system outweigh its costs? Part of such an empirical and theoretical
inquiry should include considerations such as those identified by Professor Sunstein in
his scholarship on assessing the real questions at issue and the legal weight afforded each
interest. These points suggest that we need to know much more about how judges,
agencies, and scholars employ cost-benefit analysis under the law.
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